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ABSTRACT 
The recent Brexit episode is being interpreted in some quarters as an anti-globalisation 
backlash. Free trade does not promise gains for all without a proper compensating 
mechanism that allows winners to bribe the losers. Also standard prediction of trade theory 
does point towards increasing wage inequality for the relatively skill abundant developed 
world. Theoretical discussion on compensating mechanism that addresses inequality is rare 
in trade literature. In a simple HOS model we consider tax policies that keep the pre-trade 
degree of inequality unchanged between skilled and unskilled workers. We discuss the 
problem of existence of such an inequality-neutral tax rate that generates a positive 
increment in the after tax skilled wage and unskilled wage. Such a mechanism existsand is 
independent of whether the tax is progressive or proportional. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The recent decision by UK to exit from the great coalition of European Union marks a rare 
event in the history of economic thought. This is the first formal vote of no-confidence 
against the policy of free trade in goods, services and factors. The voting pattern, as 
discussed and analysed by many suggests as follows. London voted to remain in EU and 
many industrial workers, low-skilled, less educated citizens voted to move out. Many have 
interpreted it as a decision against rising inequality within the country, effects on labor 
market and social provisions by the government due to immigration from other countries in 
Europe, particularly from the poorer regions. Information available in the net will reflect the 
point of division between London and the rest of UK. Apart from the usual rhetoric of 
whether this is good or bad for UK, whether the voters were misinformed, whether 
membership of EU has meant substantial gain for the British people etc. have been  and will 
be discussed for many years to come as post-exit Britain and EU would come to terms with 
fresh problems and prospects. This article is not to add yet another opinion to this great 
debate, but to assess how the event has enriched our understanding of standard trade and 
welfare theories and to what extent inequality becomes a pivotal theoretical issue in such 
matters. 
Certain facts need to be stated at the very outset. That free trade leads to gains for everyone 
is an incorrect, misunderstood and superficial proposition. Economic theory has always 
argued that under very ideal conditions free trade does lead to an increase in aggregate real 
income for the country that engages in trade. It is all about the aggregate and it usually states 
that if the government sits idle on the fence and does not intervene some will definitely lose. 
For example those who currently produce goods and services which will be imported and 
sold at a lower price, those workers who will face competition because their products are 
cheaper or activities are being outsourced will face hardship. Also those who face 
competition in labour market because many are arriving from Eastern Europe or from ISIS 
infested Syria and entering illegally through EU will have to suffer. Add to that the burden 
British health system has to endure because of blanket social coverage and also due to the 
fraction of GDP UK has to donate to the EU treasury. The natural query should be whether 
the aggregate gains from trade from integration with EU to UK is good enough to 
compensate each and every group for their loss and still generate a surplus for the nation. 
This is popularly coined in the literature on international trade as a process where the 
“gainers bribe the losers”. The state has to design a compensation mechanism which 
guarantees that if everyone remains at the pre-trade level of welfare, the society will still have 
some surplus. Such a mechanism actually implies that the state will tax the gainers and 
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transfer the amount to the losers so that the losers do not lose and if none is worse off and 
some are better, society will be better off, a welfare criterion suggested by Pareto, known as 
the Pareto Criterion.  
Although Mr. Pareto’s initial interest was in matters of inequality, his criterion that is 
followed with biblical devotion in the academic profession does not mention inequality of 
any sort. The fact that someone has gained a substantial amount, with Britain entering EU 
and “I am stuck with what I used to have” may not allow me to feel that I am as well off as 
before. Thus absolute versus the relative can become a great point of concern at the 
individual level. Mr. Pareto may appeal to my common sense suggesting that I am not worse 
off, but if I am in the lower branch of the distribution ladder, I would be concerned. Thus 
inequality has become the real culprit of the so called globalization process. It is no longer 
about how I am doing it is about “how come you can do so much better than me”. This brings 
in even more fundamental question regarding the perception of social inequality at the 
individual level.  
As a civilized humane person I may not like rising inequality in the society independent of 
whether I am personally affected by such a process or I may be directly affected if my 
neighbour or relative who does better than me. In both cases the simple Pareto criterion will 
not do. I am not happy simply because my own welfare level has been kept intact even if 
others have moved ahead. I can accept the change if and only if the degree of inequality is 
also kept unchanged, at the least! Thus Mr. Pareto should have laid a stronger rule for 
individual happiness, to provide enough so that the individual will not be concerned about 
inequality i.e. the relative position must remain unchanged and on top of that people should 
gain. Therefore, many allocations that tend to change the existing distribution will disturb 
one or the other. Then we ask the following question. Does trade promise enough gain to 
maintain the degree of inequality or the initial distribution and provide more to everyone?  
In a recent paper Marjit and Sarkar (2016) call this Strongly Pareto Superior or SPS 
allocation which actually means Distribution –Neutral Pareto Superior Allocation. In other 
words the government has to design tax-transfer schemes, essentially manipulating the 
public finance, to achieve such a goal. If such a goal is feasible and the government remains 
passive not doing enough, rising inequality will find the government to be the culprit. If such 
a mechanism prima facie does not exist, what the poor government will do? It has to draw 
resources beyond the sphere of trade and trade as such will not generate as much to contain 
anti-trade agitation due to rising inequality. This paper uses the well-known 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of international trade to argue that it 
is always feasible. 
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The idea that trade increases aggregate real income of the trading nation implies that we can 
redistribute the addition in a way so that everyone gets the same level of income as before 
and some can get higher income because the total has increased. But that does not 
necessarily guarantee that the relative income ratios also remain the same. Hence the degree 
of inequality might be easily disturbed. Technically speaking the associated “Lorenz Curve” 
or the “Gini Index” may change. Thus someone who feels that the job is done once the Pareto 
principle is in place, might be mistaken because some people will not like if their relative 
income falls in relation to others. Marjit and Sarkar (2016)  generally demonstrate that if 
aggregate income/welfare or any other attribute , as the case may be, goes up after the 
change, one can create a new distribution which preserves the same degree of inequality as 
before change and moreover offers extra to everyone. No one has any reason to agitate 
against rising inequality and also has all the reason to be happier than before. Thus any 
allocation of that extra amount which satisfies Pareto criterion will not help, only one and 
one of them will be acceptable. While Pareto superior allocation is not unique, SPS is. In this 
paper we provide a concrete example of such an allocation by appealing to a textbook model 
of international trade. 
 
 
Free trade under ideal conditions generates overall gains from trade increasing real national 
income. This is a standard proposition in international trade. However, there are 
distributional consequences. Some gain and some lose. The general proposition is that 
gainers can bribe the losers. Thus political authorities should be able to generate 
compensation mechanisms to help the losers. As aggregate real income increases relative to 
autarky, potentially everyone can be made better off. Thus free trade benefits all in the sense 
that even those who do not gain by trade, can be compensated by the State, if needed. This is 
as much trade theory can tell us.  
International trade theory does not suggest anything to take care of rising inequality after 
trade. If trade increases wage inequality between the skilled and the unskilled, absolute 
compensation is very unlikely to do the job. Theory of trade does not give any clue as to how 
gains from trade may be redistributed to contain rising inequality, if any. Hence one needs to 
integrate public finance with trade i.e. to explore the feasibility of a proper tax-transfer 
mechanism which this paper intends to do. Interfacingtrade and public finance, for 
understanding both problems better. It is necessary as mentioned by Atkinson(2009) and 
very recently elegantly elaborated inPol Antras et al.(2015)who have gone into the details of 
welfare consequences of tax policies in an extended trade model when such taxes create 
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distortions. However, they do not discuss this elementary case which poses a fundamental 
question i.e. whether a compensation mechanism which keeps inequality in check and 
increases after-tax income of skilled labor is at all feasible in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model. 
The traditional gains from trade theorem is directly related to Pareto criterion. If a change 
makes no one worse off and at least one better off, the change is Pareto superior to no 
change. If aggregate real income increases in free trade relative to autarky, one can distribute 
the gain in a way to make everyone as well off as before and at least one better off. 
Economists were concerned with the decline in the absolute value of real income and 
keeping everyone at the same level of welfare as in autarky was good enough policy to 
counter agitation against trade. The problem is that modern trade theorists could not 
anticipate that status quo in terms of the initial level of income was not good enough since 
everyone except the person who is better off, will feel deprived as his relative position will 
worsen even if their absolute income remains pegged at the old level. Inequality has become 
more of a concern than to remain as well off as before. Those who directly gain from trade 
need to be taxed more heavily if one has to satisfy an inequality-neutral condition given that 
the degree of inequality remains the same as before, which necessarily means that those who 
are hurt by trade are duly compensated. At the same time one has to make sure that those 
who have directly gained from trade are not losing. This will put an upper bound on the 
quantum of redistribution. Redistributive policy must not make the tax payers worse off 
relative to autarky. Thus we introduce a new welfare criterion involving inequality that is an 
extensionof the famous Pareto criterion. This is stated as follows. 
Consider two social situations A and B. A will promise greater social welfare than B iff taxes, 
collected from better off people in A relative to B, are transferred to the worse off people in A 
relative to B to keep the degree of inequality in A same as in B  and the tax payers have a 
greater after tax real income. We apply this principle in our exerciseon tax policy in an open 
economy. 
The specific purpose of this paper is to look for distribution neutral income tax rate under 
free trade as compared to autarky. It is now more or less recognised that the wage inequality 
between the skilled and unskilled workers in the developed countries has widened 
considerably along with the rising volume of trade. One can refer to a huge literature dealing 
theoretically and empirically with the problem in the context of relatively rich skill and 
capital abundant countries. Arepresentative sample will be Krugman(2000), Davis(1998, 
2011),Jones and Engerman(1996),Feenstra(2010) etc. 
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Even if by aggregate measure trade benefits a nation, the affected groups would continue to 
suffer and agitate if sufficient compensation is not made available to them at least in the 
short run to cope up with the adjustments even if trade guarantees longer run benefits. 
Adjustment problems in trade and short run and long run effects of outsourcing have been 
discussed by Chakrabarty(2004),Marjit,Beladi and Chakrabarty(2004),MarjitandMukherjee 
(2008), Bandyopadhyay, Marjit and Yang(2014)etc. 
It goes without saying that in a democracy rising inequality is a critical issue to the political 
competitors and without proper attention such inequality can jeopardize good economic 
strategies. Thus it seems natural that one would look for compensating policies to counter 
rising inequality, due to trade. i.e. due to increasing export of skilled products and import of 
cheaper unskilled items from abroad.  
In terms of a text book model of international trade and with a standard tax-transfer 
mechanism we try to characterize distribution neutral tax policy which taxes skilled workers 
and transfers the proceeds to the unskilled workers. We find out the necessary increase in 
the tax rate which keeps the wage distribution unchanged at the pre-trade level and try to 
characterize such a tax in terms of underlying parameters. The interesting part of the 
problem is to check the existence of a distribution or inequality neutral tax-rate that is low 
enough to increase net of tax skilled wage relative to autarky. We argue that such a win-win 
situation will exist. We consider proportional as well as progressive tax rates and condition 
for existence is met independent of such difference. 
Section 2 develops the model and results. Section 3 provides a general perspective and the 
last section concludes. 
 
Section 2:      Model and Results 
 
Two products X and Y use skilled and unskilled labor for production via CRS and 
diminishing marginal productivity conditions.   X is skilled labor intensive and Y is unskilled 
labor intensive. The competitive price equation with Y as the numeraire yields 
         (1) 
	  	  1     (2) 
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The symbols have usual meaning a la Jones (1965). The country concerned is skilled labor 
abundant and as trade opens up with̂  0,     denotes percentage change. 
=	 ||and  -	

||(3) 
With||    	  0  by the factor intensity assumption.                                                                       
This is the standard Stolper-Samuelsonresult. Opening up to trade increases inequality 
between and  ,with   0,   0. We now turn to the welfare policy of the government 
to compensate the unskilled workers. 
Suppose the govt. taxes the skilled workers by taxing  with a proportional tax and 
redistributes the tax proceeds to the unskilled workers.If  and! are the numbers of skilled 
and unskilled workers respectively then the after transfer wage to the unskilled worker is 
given by (4) 
"  =    #$ .&         (4) 
and after tax wage rate of the skilled labor is  
'= (1  )        (5) 
We can easily prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If * is kept unchanged, increase in +,will be enough 
tocompensatefor a decline in + iff -./ 0  1, 
Where 1 = ++2*+,3.
 
Proof:"4  5  (1  5)6       (6) 
=   5(  ) 
= 

|| 7	   5(	  	)8 
= 

|| (	  5) ( 7) 
If	 0  5,increase in due to trade provides full compensation to the unskilled workers for 
the initial loss due to trade. Thus, if the objective is to insulatethe unskilled wage, a high 
	  or low λshould be desirable. Following observations are in order. 
If initial tax rate is fairly low, then5will be close to 1 and as	  1,with the same ,  govt. will 
not be able to compensate the loss. Such critical, , say is solved as follows.  
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For 	=5 > 	   ##2?@$AB
 
Or,     (CDBE)BE@$@  .AB
(8) 
Thus initial tax rate has to be equal to  for "4  0.  Note that such adepends on initial 
relative wageG#$# H. Higher initial
#$
#will reduceI, because there is more to redistribute. Very 
high value of

&will demand a much higher initial tax rate to be in place for neutralizing the 
impact on . The next step is to consider the case when raising w is not enough and the govt. 
tries to contain inequality. 
 
Distribution-Neutral tax rate 
We shall consider the case when the govt. worries about the inequality between after tax 
skilled wage and transfer supported unskilled wage. Thus the measure is given by
#"$
#" instead 
of
#$
# . To start with before trade there was an initial value of
#$'
#"  and the govt. looks at the post 
trade value of
#"$
#" . Note that even if is kept unchanged, increase in by itself will raise 
income of the unskilled. But let us see to what extent. 
Proposition 2: If * is kept unchanged,(+"4 ,-+"4)  J i.e. inequality must increase. 
Proof:We know "4  = || (	  5)for ̂ =0(9) 
Hence ("4   "4)   	 ||  

|| (	  5) 
   =  5 ||  0      KLM. 
Proposition 2 suggests that to counter rising inequality must increase. 
Let us now consider the problem of existence of a distribution-neutral tax rate N such that it 
satisfies two conditions.  
("4- "4) =0 (10)and      "4  0  (11) 
 (10) implies that the degree of inequality is kept at the initial level neutralisingthe trade 
impact. (11) implies that after tax skilled wage is still greater under trade.  
"4   - ̂ ?(CD?)(12) 
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"4  5  + (1  5)(̂  )(13) 
Now ("4- "4)  0 >    ̂ ?(CD?)   5  (1  5)(̂   ) =0 
                              Or,    ̂ = O(#$D# )(CDO)2 P(QRP) 
   = 
O( S|T|)
(CDO)2 P(QRP)
                   (14) 
The neutral tax rate N is given by N  (1  ̂) 
–̂ ?(CD?)  0 [from (11) & (12)] 
> 	 ||  ̂
?
(CD?)(15) 
Substituting for ̂from (14) we get 
	  O?O?2(CDO)(16) 
Equation (16) summarises two conditions.  First, inequality is contained at the pre trade level 
and such taxation is fair in the sense that the skilled workers’ after-tax income has been 
allowed to grow. But the problem is that whether such condition is likely to be satisfied, 
which will guarantee the existence of aN.  
We simplify condition (16) further 
	  O?O?2(CDO)   
C
C2QP(
Q
UDC)
(17) 
From the definition of5 V  ##2?@$AB
 ,  equation (17) boils down to  
	  CC2QP(?@$@ .AB)
  CC2@$@ .AB
(18) 
 
Proposition (3): Such a tax- transfer mechanism will always exist. 
       
Proof :Following from (18) that does not contain t, a little manipulation yields that  for 
(18) to hold
#$
#  W
C
BE  1X

 (19) 
This boils down to(S/L)  >  ( asy / asy ) 
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Note that as the country is a typical HOS economy exporting skill intensive good and is 
incompletely specialized this must hold as the endowment ratio must lie within the cone of 
diversification i.e.  (asx / alx  ) > S/L > (asy / aly ). QED 
We know that free trade does not guarantee that everyone will gain due to trade, some will 
and some won’t. But gainers should be able to bribe losers. Problem is that such 
compensation is not enough to tackle rising inequality due to trade. This is a different 
parameter which compensation schemes in the context of trade theory never took account of. 
Thus the standard compensation criteria did not have any formulation to design 
distribution-neutral compensation mechanism. We have proved that a distribution neutral 
tax transfer mechanism that guarantees a rise in after tax wage of the skilled worker and 
maintains the degree of inequality at the pre-trade level does exist. 
 
 
Progressive Tax 
Now we redo the exercise with a progressive tax that increases with. In particularwe 
propose a tax elasticityYsuch that̂   Y Working through the same process as before we 
get      
"4= (1  Y)(20)     ; where   ?(CD?) 
"4   5  (1  5)(1  Y)(21) 
"4  "4   5 |Z|  Y(1  5  )

|Z| 	(22)  ; [by (20)-(21)& substituting    
                                            for andfrom(3)] 
Note that withY  0 equation (22) boils down to the case of a proportional tax. 
"4  "4  0 iffY  OBE(C2[DO)(23) 
"4  0 iff1  Y(24) 
1  Y  0 iff  C2[DOO[ 
C
BE 
Substituting forand5we get 
1  Y  0 iff 
#$
#  W
C
BE  1X

(25) [using (23)] 
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Note that condition (25) is exactly the same condition required in the case of proportional 
tax. 
 
Section 3:     A General Perspective and Conclusion 
 
We started with the question whether one can design a compensation mechanism that not 
only protects absolute income of those who are adversely affected by trade, but also 
guarantees that the degree of inequality remains unchanged at the autarchic level and at the 
same time those who gain from trade continue to enjoy a higher after-tax income. We have 
used a standard HOS type model with skilled and unskilled labor and a trade induced rise in 
skilled wage and a decline in unskilled wage to show that without increase in the tax rate, the 
rise in skilled wage will not give enough resources to keep inequality under control. 
However, a tax rate proportional or progressive will always exist which, if implemented, will 
serve the purpose. Inequality will remain the same and skilled workers would still gain.  
This result modifies the well-known Pareto ranking hypothesis which does not consider 
rising inequality while making welfare comparisons. One must compensate the losers more 
than what is needed to keep them on the same level of real income as before as inequality 
will be on the rise. The simple workhorse of trade theory shows that even such compensation 
can be designed through a transfer from gainers. 
 Marjit and Sarkar (2016 ) show that for any actual distribution that indicates an increase in 
aggregate value of the relevant attribute across agents relative to the original , one can 
construct a counter factual distribution which is distribution neutral compared to the 
original distribution and guarantees greater value for everyone. Thus gains from trade 
theorem or higher growth of income will guarantee such outcome with a proper tax-transfer 
mechanism. This inequality preserving efficiency result is coined as Strongly Pareto Superior 
(SPS) allocation. Thus the present work represents a case of a more general proposition. In 
this paper we do not deal with aggregate welfare but with aggregate wage income. But one 
can easily recast the analysis in terms of aggregate income/ welfare following Marjit and 
Sarkar (2016).We discuss the case with aggregate income. The case with welfare will proceed 
in the same manner. 
Note that aggregate income must increase under trade as aggregate labor income, skilled 
plus unskilled, is nothing but aggregate value of output PX + Y and as terms of trade improve 
the change in income is captured by dP.X>0, after using the simple envelope property and 
with dP>0. As total value of labor income goes up, one can design a tax-transfer mechanism, 
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following Marjit and Sarkar (2016), that is distribution neutral and guarantees higher 
income level to both types of workers. Such a value of tax/ transfer is solved by setting the 
counter factual degree of inequality between the skilled and the unskilled exactly the same as 
the autarkic inequality. Once that transfer is determined, one needs to impose the condition 
that after tax and transfer both skilled and unskilled workers are better off. This boils down 
to the condition that the aggregate labor- income must be higher, which is true under free 
trade. This is an alternative way of solving the problem. 
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